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Quantum bit string sealing
Guang-Ping He
Department of Physics and Advanced Research Center,
Zhongshan University, Guangzhou 510275, China
Though it was proven that secure quantum sealing of a single classical bit is impossible in principle,
here we propose an unconditionally secure quantum sealing protocol which seals a classical bit string.
Any reader can obtain each bit of the sealed string with an arbitrarily small error rate, while reading
the string is detectable. The protocol is simple and easy to be implemented. The possibility of using
this protocol to seal a single bit in practical is also discussed.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum sealing is a young member of quantum cryp-
tography. But classical sealing has entered our everyday
life for centuries. For example, people sometimes put im-
portant letters or documents inside an envelope, and seal
the envelope by melting wax over the cover flap. Ad-
ditionally, the wax can be impressed with an image to
indicate authenticity, such as a family crest. If the wax
was broken or the image looks unmatched, then someone
may have opened the envelope and read the document.
Thus it provides a method to check whether the secret
document remains secure or not. Obviously it is useful to
expand the idea of classical sealing to the digital world.
However, just as other classical cryptographic protocols,
no classical sealing protocol can be unconditionally se-
cure. This is because there is no no-cloning theorem of
classical data to prevent a cheater from copying and read-
ing all the data without being detected.
On the other hand, quantum cryptography has made
significant progress in the last two decades. Many quan-
tum protocols, e.g. the conjugate coding[1] and the well-
known quantum key distribution[2, 3, 4], surpassed their
classical counterparts as their security is rested on the ba-
sic laws of quantum mechanics and can be uncondition-
ally secure. Therefore it is natural to ask whether the
quantum no-cloning theorem[5] can make secure quan-
tum sealing possible. Bechmann-Pasquinucci[6] proposed
the first quantum sealing protocol in 2003 which seals a
single classical bit with a three-qubit state, shortly fol-
lowed by Chau[7] with a protocol which seals quantum
data with quantum error correcting code. In 2005, Singh
and Srikanth[8] extended the idea of Ref.[6] into a many-
qubit majority voting scheme, and associated it with se-
cret sharing to improve the security. These protocols
can be divided into two types. The first two are perfect
quantum sealing in the sense that a reader can obtain
the sealed data with certainty. The last one is imperfect
for the reader cannot do so accurately.
However, as pointed out by the authors themselves,
the protocols in Refs.[6, 7] are insecure against collec-
tive measurements. More general, it was proven[9] that
secure perfect quantum sealing is impossible in princi-
ple. With collective measurements, the reader can always
read the data without being detected. Very recently, the
general models of imperfect quantum sealing were stud-
ied by He[10] and Chau[11] with different approaches,
showing that they are also insecure for sealing a single
classical bit. The reader can always cheat successfully
with a non-trivial probability. Consequently, the major-
ity voting scheme in Ref.[8] is insecure alone, if it is not
associated with secret sharing. That is, its security has
to fall back on that of the secret sharing scheme. The
existence of these three no-go proofs seems to put an end
to the development of quantum sealing.
This is not true. Though secure quantum sealing of
a single classical bit is impossible, it will be shown in
this paper that quantum sealing of a classical bit string
can be unconditionally secure. At the first glance, this
result seems odd since classical reasoning suggests that
secure bit string sealing implies secure single bit sealing
and hence conflicts with the above no-go proofs. But
as pointed out by Kent[12], reductions and relations be-
tween classical cryptographic tasks need not necessarily
apply to their quantum equivalents. Similar situation
happened before in quantum cryptography. Though the
possibility of unconditionally secure quantum bit com-
mitment was excluded by the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go
theorem[13, 14], Kent found that secure quantum bit
string commitment protocol exists[12]. In this paper, a
secure quantum bit string sealing protocol will be pro-
posed. It achieves the following goal: each bit of the
string can be obtained by the reader with an arbitrarily
small error rate, while reading the string can be detected
except with an exponentially small probability. The sig-
nificance of the protocol lies in three major aspects. (1)
In practical, it is obvious that sealing a long bit string is
much more useful than sealing a single bit. (2) As shown
by Gordon Worley III[15], secure quantum sealing, if ex-
ists, has wide applications in many different fields, e.g.
loose bit commitment, binary semaphores, eavesdropping
detection and protective packaging. Therefore our pro-
tocol can re-open new venues for these applications that
once closed by the no-go proofs. (3) The protocol is very
simple to be implemented with the techniques available
nowadays. In additional, the protocol also makes it possi-
ble to implement “computationally” secure quantum bit
sealing in practical.
2II. THE PROTOCOL
Quantum bit string sealing can be summarized as the
following two-party cryptographic problem. A sender Al-
ice encodes an n-bit string with quantum states. Any
reader Bob can obtain the string from these states, while
reading the string should be detectable. Clearly quan-
tum bit sealing can be viewed as the special case where
n = 1.
Consider the ideal case without transmission error. Let
Θ (0 < Θ ≪ pi/4) and α (0 < α < 1/2) be two fixed
constants. We propose the following quantum bit string
sealing protocol:
Sealing: To seal a classical n-bit string b = b1b2...bn
(bi ∈ {0, 1}), Alice randomly chooses θi (−Θ/n
α 6 θi 6
Θ/nα) and encodes each bit bi in a qubit state |ψi〉 =
cos θi |bi〉+ sin θi
∣∣b¯i〉. She makes these n qubits publicly
accessible to the reader, while keeping all θi (i = 1, ..., n)
secret.
Reading: When Bob wants to read the string b, he
simply measures each qubit in the computational basis
{|0〉 , |1〉}, and denotes the outcome as |b′i〉. He takes the
string b′ = b′1b
′
2...b
′
n as b.
Checking: At any time, Alice can check whether the
sealed string b has been read by trying to project the i-th
qubit into cos θi |bi〉 + sin θi
∣∣b¯i〉. If all the n qubits can
be projected successfully, she concludes that the string b
is still unread. Otherwise if any of the qubits fails, she
knows that b is read.
Obviously this new protocol achieves the following
goal: each bit sealed by Alice can be read success-
fully by Bob, except with a probability not greater than
ε ≡ sin2(Θ/nα). Thus by increasing n, the reading error
rate ε can be made arbitrarily small.
In the next section it will be proven that the protocol
also guarantees that: if the string was read, it will be
detected by the checking process except with an expo-
nentially small probability.
III. PROOF OF SECURITY
When the reader Bob measures the i-th qubit in the
basis {|0〉 , |1〉}, the qubit collapses to |b′i〉. We may
even assume Bob to be malevolent, that he replaces
each qubit with another quantum state |ψ′i〉 after read-
ing it, so that his chance to pass the checking with-
out being detected might be increased. Due to the no-
cloning theorem of quantum states[5], Bob cannot deter-
mine and copy the state |ψi〉 exactly since he does not
know θi. He cannot even be sure whether b
′
i = bi or
not after he read |ψi〉. Thus he has to pick another θ
′
i
(−Θ/nα 6 θ′i 6 Θ/n
α) himself and prepares the fake
state as |ψ′i〉 = cos θ
′
i |b
′
i〉 + sin θ
′
i
∣∣b¯′i〉. Since the case
b′i = bi (or b
′
i = b¯i) will occur with the probability
cos2 θi (or sin
2 θi), the fake state |ψ
′
i〉 can be projected to
|ψi〉 = cos θi |bi〉 + sin θi
∣∣b¯i〉 successfully in the checking
process with the probability
pi = cos
2 θi cos
2(θi − θ
′
i) + sin
2 θi sin
2(θi + θ
′
i). (1)
When θi is evenly distributed among the range
[−Θ/nα,Θ/nα], the average of pi is
p¯i =
1
2Θ/nα
∫ Θ/nα
−Θ/nα
pidθi. (2)
Its maximum can be reached when θ′i = 0. That is, it
is better for Bob not to fake the state, but simply leaves
the i-th qubit as it is after measuring it. In this case
pi = 1−
1
2
sin2 2θi. (3)
Therefore the total probability for Bob to read k = βn
(0 6 β 6 1) bits without being detected is
P =
ik∏
i=i1
(1 −
1
2
sin2 2θi), (4)
which drops exponentially as k → n, and vanishes when
n→∞ as long as 0 < α < 1/2.
However, in the more general case Bob may not read
the string with the measurement suggested by the pro-
tocol. He may not even want to learn each bi individu-
ally, but tries to perform collective measurement on the
whole system Ψ = ψ1ψ2...ψn so that he can obtain some
global properties of the string (e.g. parity, weight etc.).
In this case, let H denotes the 2n dimensional Hilbert
space where Ψ lives in. Suppose that Ψ finally collapses
into a subspace V after Bob performs certain POVMs.
Let {v} and m be the computational basis and the di-
mensionality of V respectively. Then no matter how the
details of Bob’s cheating strategy could be, the amount
of information Bob obtained is bound by
k = log2 2
n − log2m. (5)
Meanwhile, the final state of Ψ is
|Ψ′〉 =
1
N
∑
v∈V
|v〉 〈v| Ψ〉 , (6)
where the normalization constant
N = (
∑
v∈V
|〈v| Ψ〉|
2
)1/2. (7)
Again, it can be shown that it is better for Bob not to
fake the state. Then |Ψ′〉 can be projected to the initial
state |Ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 |ψ2〉 ... |ψn〉 successfully in the checking
process with the probability
P = |〈Ψ| Ψ′〉|
2
=
∑
v∈V
|〈v| Ψ〉|2 . (8)
3Since |ψi〉 = cos θi |bi〉+ sin θi
∣∣b¯i〉 and {v} is the compu-
tational basis, for any v we have
|〈v| Ψ〉|
2
6
n∏
i=1
cos2 θi. (9)
Therefore the total probability for Bob to obtain k bits
of information without being detected is
P 6 m ·
n∏
i=1
cos2 θi = 2
−k
n∏
i=1
2 cos2 θi. (10)
which also drops exponentially as k → n, and vanishes
when n→∞ as long as 0 < α < 1/2.
As a result, no matter Bob reads the string with in-
dividual or collective measurements, the probability for
him to avoid from being detected will always be expo-
nentially small as the amount of information he obtained
increases. Thus the protocol is unconditionally secure.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
A. Relationship with the no-go proofs
The existence of this secure quantum bit string sealing
protocol does not conflict with the no-go proofs of quan-
tum single bit sealing[9, 10, 11]. In fact, our quantum
bit string sealing protocol can be viewed as the assembly
of n imperfect quantum single bit sealing process. From
the security proof in the above section, we can see that
if Bob reads only few bits, the disturbance on the quan-
tum states is small that it is almost undetectable. In this
sense, the sealing of each single bit of the string is inse-
cure. Also, it is insecure to use the global properties of
the string (e.g. parity, weight etc.) to implement single
bit sealing. But if Bob reads a large number of bits, the
small disturbance on every single qubit will be piled up
together so that the detecting probability will increase
dramatically. Hence the sealing of the whole string can
be secure.
B. The protocol is an imperfect sealing one
The sealed string can only be read with a non-zero
error rate ε ≡ sin2(Θ/nα). We cannot associate the pro-
tocol with classical error-correcting codes or any other
method to make the string perfectly retrievable. This
is because the above security proof is based on the fact
that Bob has no pre-knowledge on the string and the
quantum states. If he is provided with a certain classical
error-correcting code or anything relevant with the sealed
string, he may have other methods to construct his col-
lective measurements so that the security proof may not
be valid any more. In fact, it is trivial to show that the
no-go proof of perfect quantum bit sealing[9] can be gen-
eralized to the case of perfect quantum bit string sealing.
If the whole string becomes perfectly retrievable, then
each bit of the string is perfectly retrievable too. From
the proof in Ref.[9] we can see that if Bob reads every
single bit with collective measurements, the disturbance
will rigorously equal to zero. Thus the total detecting
probability will not be piled up but still equal to zero.
Therefore, though the error rate ε can be made arbitrar-
ily small, we cannot expect to find methods to make it
completely vanished.
On the other hand, as pointed out in Ref.[10], the no-
go proof of imperfect quantum single bit sealing does not
cover the case of string sealing. More rigorously, in our
protocol by expanding the state |Ψ〉 in the computational
basis of the global Hilbert space H , we can see that |Ψ〉
covers all eigenvectors ofH . That is, the “sub”-space sup-
ported by |Ψ〉 is exactly the space H itself. Therefore the
spaces supported by different states which encode differ-
ent strings completely overlap with each other. No mea-
surement can distinguish them apart without disturbing
the states seriously. Thus the cheating strategy in the no-
go proofs of imperfect quantum single bit sealing[10, 11]
does not apply here.
C. Implementability
Our protocol can be executed as long as Alice has the
probability to prepare each single qubit in a pure state,
while Bob can perform individual measurement. No en-
tanglement or collective measurement required. There-
fore the protocol can be demonstrated and verified with
the techniques available nowadays. Of course for practi-
cal uses, storing quantum states for a long period of time
is still a technical challenge today. But this is a problem
which all quantum sealing protocols have to face. Our
protocol may already be one of the simplest in all possi-
ble quantum bit string sealing protocols.
V. SEALING A SINGLE BIT IN PRACTICAL
Though secure sealing of a single bit is impossible in
principle, if a protocol can be found in which reading
the bit dishonestly is much more difficult than doing so
honestly, it will still be valuable in practical. The no-
go proof of imperfect quantum bit sealing[10] leaves a
clue on how to construct such a protocol. As pointed
out in that reference, quantum sealing protocol generally
contains the following feature: Bob knows an operation
P and two sets G0, G1, such that if he applies P on the
quantum system that seals the bit and the outcome is
g ∈ G0 (or g ∈ G1), he should take the value of the sealed
bit as 0 (or 1). Though in principle we cannot exclude
this feature from the protocol (otherwise the sealed bit
becomes irretrievable), we can keep the dishonest reader
from knowing P , G0 and G1 too easily. The method is:
Alice can seal the description of P , G0 and G1 with the
quantum string sealing protocol. If Bob wants to decode
4the sealed bit correctly, he should read this sealed string
first. Thus the status of the sealed bit can be checked by
detecting whether the sealed string has been read.
For example, Alice first encodes the following sentence
into a classical binary bit string
“Measure the last two qubits in the basis
{cos 15◦ |0〉+ sin 15◦ |1〉 ,− sin 15◦ |0〉+ cos 15◦ |1〉}
and you will know the value of the sealed bit from
their parity. Other qubits following this sentence
are all dummy qubits . You can simply leave them
alone.”
Then she seals it with our quantum string sealing proto-
col, and provides Bob the qubits encoding this sentence,
followed by a large number of qubits where only the last
two are actually useful.
However, this bit sealing method is still insecure in
principle. This is because any given classical n-bit string
can be decoded into one sentence only, and the mean-
ing of the sentence will reveal the value of the sealed bit
unambiguously. As long as a dishonest Bob knows the
length n of the sealed string, he can study all the 2n pos-
sible classical n-bit strings, decode them into sentences,
and divide these sentences into G0 and G1 (of course
there will also be tons of meaningless sentences. Bob can
simply leave them alone). Then as described in Ref.[10],
he needs not to know the content of the sealed sentence
exactly. He simply constructs a proper collective mea-
surement to determine whether the sentence belongs to
G0 or G1. Thus he will know the sealed bit from the n
qubits without disturbing them too much.
But if n is sufficiently large, the number of possible
sentences will be enormous. There could be sentences as
simple as
“It is 0. Ignore the rest qubits .”
But there are also sentences like
“Decode the bits following this sentence as a
bitmap image and you will find clues to the
value of the sealed bit”
or
“Go to the main library. Find the book on the
top − left of the last shelf . Turn to the last page,
and count how many times the letter K occurs
in the 3rd line......”
or even
“Dig my backyard until you find water . Count
how many feet you digged . Then divide it by the
height of the tree in the north corner ......”
In this case, even if a dishonest Bob has the technique
to perform collective measurements on the n-qubit sys-
tem, in practical it is nearly impossible to check all these
sentences and find out the bit value they are correspond-
ing to. On the other hand, an honest Bob needs not to
worry about this. He can simply read the sealed string
honestly and then follows the instruction to decode the
sealed bit. In this sense, such sealing can be viewed as
a kind of “computationally” secure quantum single bit
sealing in practical.
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